

Message Text

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FILE; TELEGRAM TEXT FOR THIS SEGMENT IS UNAVAILABLE

ADP000

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 05955 02 OF 02 082033Z

45

ACTION SS-30

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2183

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5955

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

8. JOHNSON ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AND SAID THAT SINCE UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OUR NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, HE CONCLUDED THAT IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH SEMENOV WAS REFERRING TO NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE POSSESSION OF THIRD COUNTRIES.

9. SEMENOV REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A RELEVANT QUESTION AND HE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS IT IN ORDER TO GIVE JOHNSON A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET APPROACH. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE ISSUES WE WERE DISCUSSING AND THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALREADY TOUCHED ON THIS QUESTION BEFORE. ALTHOUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HERE CONCERNED LIMITATION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS OF ONLY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, ONE COULD NOT IGNORE SUCH AN IMPORTANT FACT IN TERMS OF AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN GENERAL, AND PARTICULARLY IN ITS LONG-TERM PROSPECTS, AS THE PRESENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. AS NOTED BY L. I. BREZHNEV IN HIS OCTOBER 26, 1973 SPEECH, "WE BELIEVE IN A WORLD IN WHICH EVERYTHING IS CLOSELY INTERRELATED. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT IN THE LONG TERM BE RESTRICTED TO THE EFFORTS OF ONLY TWO STATES, PARTICULARLY WHEN OTHERS -- AND ABOVE ALL NUCLEAR POWERS -- WILL AT THE SAME TIME CONTINUE TO BUILD UP THEIR ARMAMENTS."

10. SEMENOV SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED BY HIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05955 02 OF 02 082033Z

GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION HERE. THESE ASPECTS WERE IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE U.S. SIDE AND HE WOULD REFER TO THEM ONLY AS THEY RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE SUBJECT F OUR NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE THIRD COUNTRY QUESTION IN THIS CONTEXT WAS NOT NEW AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS. HE THOUGHT JOHNSON WOULD RECALL THAT ON MAY 26, 1972 THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD MADE A FORMAL STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE EFFECT THAT "IF DURING THE PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT U.S. ALLIES IN NATO SHOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF THEIR MODERN SUBMARINES TO EXCEED THE NUMBERS OF SUBMARINES THEY WOULD HAVE OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ITS SUBMARINES." THIS POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN REGARD TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FULLY RETAINS ITS VALIDITY TODAY. OBVIOUSLY NOW. WHEN WE WERE ENGAGED IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS TO BE OF UNLIMITED DURATION, WE COULD NOT FAIL TO TAKE INTO AOCOUNT MORE FULLY THE FACTOR OF THE PRESENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED TO TAKE THIS FACTOR INTO APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WAYS FOR THEIR LIMITATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD ADDRESSED THIS SUBJECT IN ITS STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1973.

11. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, LIMITATIONS SHOULD APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WERE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND WITH DUE ACCOECIFIC FEATURES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES AND THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. EVIDENTLY ONLY THAT KIND OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON EQUITABLE LEVELS FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. TO ENSURE EQUAL SECURITY ONE COULD NOT IGNORE A FACT THAT HE BELIEVED JOHNSON WOULD UNDERSTAND VERY WELL, I.E., THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PRESENCE AND BUILD-UP

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 05955 02 OF 02 082033Z

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES IN A GREATER DEGREE THAN THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION, IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

12. SEMENOV SAID THAT HIS PURPOSE TODAY WAS TO MAKE SURE THAT

JOHNSON WOULD RETAIN A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ALL THESE QUESTIONS IN THEIR TOTALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME HE WOULD STRESS THAT NONE OF THIS WAS IN ANY WAY DIRECTED AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES; BUT CONCERN ABOUT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY WAS THE OBLIGATION OF ANY STATE ENGAGING IN NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH RESPONSIBLE AND IMPORTANT MATTERS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD SET FORTH ITS VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF CARDINAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT AND HAD DONE SO AS FRANKLY AND SINCERELY AS IS APPROPRIATE AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD WELCOME U.S. VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS HE HAD ADDRESSED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD ALSO TABLED A PROPOSAL ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVED IT TO BE OBJECTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE. WHAT DID THE U.S. SIDE HAVE TO OFFER? IN SAYING THIS, HE WOULD NOT WANT HIS WORDS TO BE INTERPRETED AS AN INVITATION TO ENGAGE IN POLEMICS OR ARGUMENTS, OR AS AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE JOHNSON IN AN AWKWARD POSITION. THIS WAS FAR FROM HIS INTENTION AND FROM THE PURPOSES OF THE SOVIET SIDE, SINCE IN ENGAGING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE WAS GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND EXPAND PEACEFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. AS JOHNSON, TOO, HAD REPEATEDLY SAID, THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WAS FAR TOO IMPORTANT TO PERMIT ANY SUCH MOTIVES OR APPROACHES. IT REQUIRED AN UNBIASED AND RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE QUESTIONS WE WERE DISCUSSING.

13. SEMENOV DID NOT EXPECT THAT JOHNSON WOULD REPLY TO ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS TODAY OR EVEN AT THE CURRENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAVE THESE ASPECTS IN ITS FIELD OF VISION WHEN IT ANALYZED THE ISSUES AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT IT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH OF THE SOVIT SIDE TO ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS, JUST AS TO EVERYTHING ELSE THAT WAS RELATED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND STRENGTHENING PEACEFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES IN GENERAL AND PARTICULARLY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET POSITION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 05955 02 OF 02 082033Z

WAS NOW WELL KNOW TO THE U.S. SIDE. HE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN WHAT THE U.S. SIDE WOULD HAVE TO OFFER THAT WOULD PROMOTE THE EVOLUTION OF OUR TALKS. A REPLY TO THIS QUESTION OR TO OTHER INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET SIDE IN TERMS OF HELPING TO ADVANCE AND DEVELOP OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

14. SEMENOV APOLOGIZED FOR HAVING TALKED AS MUCH AS HE NORMALLY DID AT FORMAL MEETINGS, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD ARRIVED AT A STAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WHEN IT COULD BE USEFUL TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR A PRIVATE CONVERSATION IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE OPINIONS WITHOUT UNNECESSARY POLEMICS AND IN A FRANK AND SINCERE MANNER. HE WAS CERTAIN

THAT THIS WOULD PROMOTE THE PRODUCTIVENESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

END TEXT

JOHNSON

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